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ABSTRACT
Armed-conflicts often occur in tropical areas considered to be of high ‘conservation-value’, termed as such for
their biodiversity or carbon-storage functions. Despite this important overlap, few studies have assessed how
forest-biomass is affected by armed-conflicts. Thus, in this paper we develop a multinomial logit model to examine
how outcomes of the interactions between carbon-storage, armed-conflict and deforestation rates are linked to
social, institutional and economic factors. We use Colombia as a case study because of its protracted armed-
conflict, high forest-cover, sustained deforestation rates and on-going peace processes. Our empirical results show
that the impacts of armed-conflicts on forest-cover are connected to specific socio-economical processes, such as
unequal land distribution and land-grabbing, which typically occurs as part of ‘agricultural colonization’. Findings
address a research gap by providing statistically sound evidence for associations between armed-conflicts and
land-related grievances, which has rarely been demonstrated empirically. Our results also suggest that forest
commons are associated with reduced armed-conflict, and simultaneously provide contributions to carbon storage
and to meeting basic needs. Moreover, our forest-conflict transition models provide useful visual means to capture
and relay to policymakers- the causes of forest cover-changes in a conflict-affected country. Finally, our findings
imply that in dedicating their efforts to resolving land-ownership disputes, the Colombian government might
uphold their international climate change commitments via reducing deforestation and hence forest based carbon
emissions, while pursuing their national security objective via undermining opportunities for guerrilla groups to
operate.
KEYWORDS
REDD+; Forest conservation; Forest conflicts; Armed conflicts; Climate change; Multinomial
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1. INTRODUCTION
The global demand for increased forest-biomass for climate change mitigation (Harris et al.,
2012), in combination with the need for peacebuilding in many countries with large tracts of
tropical forests (Hanson et al., 2009), makes the relationship between forest-biomass and
armed-conflicts particularly important. That is, tropical forests not only play a key role in global
climate change, they also host many of the world’s armed-conflicts. Despite this important
overlap, the ways in which tropical forest-biomass and armed-conflicts are linked is unclear, as
are the ways that specific contextual factors interact and determine forest-cover loss, or
conversely help to conserve it (Aide and Grau, 2004; Burgess et al., 2015; Butsic et al., 2015;
Hecht and Saatchi, 2007; Ordway, 2015; Sanchez-Cuervo and Aide, 2013).
A better understanding of these relationships could assist policymakers demonstrate the
impacts of conflict and post-conflict scenarios on forest-cover, therefore permitting them to
justify peacebuilding measures as contributions to carbon-storage efforts and, ultimately, to
climate change mitigation (Bates, 2016; Castro-Nunez et al., 2016; Castro-Nunez et al., 2017).
The mechanism for reducing forest-based greenhouse gas emissions (known as REDD+), agreed
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, is
a concrete tool that may be used to jointly address carbon storage and peacebuilding. For
instance, when the later successful 2016 peace agreement between the Government of
Colombia (GoC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was negotiated, the
GoC submitted a Forest Reference Emissions Level (FREL) to the UNFCCC arguing that the
cessation of conflict will increase forest-based emissions in the Colombian Amazon by 10 %
mostly as a result of deforestation due to increased forest access (MADS, 2014). However,
there is, in fact, no agreed theoretical framework for understanding how forest-biomass might
be affected by either the continuation or cessation of armed conflicts (Ordway, 2015).
Causal links between forest-cover and armed-conflicts originate in the ‘environmental security’
field (de Jong et al., 2007). Environmental security literature generally groups such linkages into
three possible mechanisms: natural resource scarcity or unequal sharing (Homer-Dixon, 1994);
accessibility and competition (Peluso and Watts, 2001); or opportunities that forested areas
present for illegal armed groups’ covert operations (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Moreover,
these three foci indicate that forested landscapes are linked to areas with: (1) weak state
presence , (2)  high-value natural resources for financing combatants and armed groups’
hideouts, (3) grievances (for example due to disputes over resources rights and access), (4) a
civil population that has been attacked and displaced by armed groups attempting to
accumulate assets and expand their territorial control (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; de Jong et al.,
2007; Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012; Rustad et al., 2008). However, despite many arguments
linking forests with armed-conflicts, much empirical research indicates that the mere condition
of ‘tropical forest-cover’ is a poor predictor of conflict (Harwell, 2010; Rustad et al., 2008).
Meanwhile, forest-cover changes are principally caused by agricultural expansion, wood
extraction and infrastructure, which in turn are driven by various factors including social and
political unrest (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Consequently, empirical studies of conflict and post-
conflict periods’ impacts on forest-cover provide varied and often divergent findings (Baumann
and Kuemmerle, 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Ordway, 2015). Increases in forest-cover have been
attributed to: forced migration (Aide and Grau, 2004); a variety of social, institutional and
economic behavioural patterns, such as reduced agricultural production due to remittances
(Hecht and Saatchi, 2007); and post-war economic development (Rudel et al., 2000). In other
analyses, forest-biomass loss has been linked to armed groups’ natural resource exploitation
(Butsic et al., 2015; Ordway, 2015; Sanchez-Cuervo and Aide, 2013). More recently, it has been
argued that the impacts of armed-conflicts depend on specific contextual factors (Baumann and
Kuemmerle, 2016), which include armed groups’ strategic use of forested areas (Castro-Nunez
et al., 2016). Analyses, however, might be faulted for their focus on national and sub-national
correlations between tropical forest-cover and armed-conflict variables, without considering
other factors contributing to both conflict and forest-cover changes. That is, these studies often
fail to account for the complex interplay of social, economic and institutional contexts related
to natural resource and forest use (Harwell, 2010). As a result, in contexts of armed conflict, it
remains unclear which social, economic and institutional factors are related to positive
(increased forest biomass and biodiversity) or negative outcomes (reduced forest biomass and
biodiversity).
The objective of this paper is thus to improve the understanding of the links between tropical
forests-biomass and armed-conflicts. To this end, we examine how carbon-storage, armed-
conflict and forest-cover change are jointly linked to social, institutional and economic factors
by using publicly available municipality-level data from Colombia. Specifically, our analysis
focuses on how outcomes of the interactions between carbon-storage, armed-conflict and
forest-cover change (defined by classifying Colombian mainland municipalities based on three
variables carbon storage, armed actions and deforestation rates), are associated with eight
factors, namely: demography; conflict victims; illegal activities; land inequality; institutional
performance; accessibility; poverty; and forest commons. These factors were selected because
each has been associated, albeit in varying ways, with forest-cover changes (Armenteras et al.,
2013a; Chadid et al., 2015; Davalos et al., 2011; Dávalos et al., 2014; Etter et al., 2006b; Geist
and Lambin, 2002; Sanchez-Cuervo and Aide, 2013), as well as with various levels of conflict in
Colombia (Albertus and Kaplan, 2013; Ibáñez and Moya, 2010; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Ross,
2007).
2. THE STUDY SITE
Colombia, located in north-western South America, covers an area of 1.1 million km2, and is
inhabited by approximately 45.4 million people. The country comprises 32 departments (sub-
national jurisdictions), which are divided into 1,123 municipalities (including those located in
the Archipelago of San Andrés, Santa Catalina and Providencia). Colombia’s economy is based
on agricultural production (mainly coffee cultivation and cattle ranching), mining and oil
production and with an estimated 14% of earth’s biodiversity the country has the third highest
biodiversity in the world (Armenteras et al., 2006; Orme et al., 2005). Therefore, many people
regard protection of Colombia’s forests and biodiversity as a global conservation priority (Myers
et al., 2000; Olson and Dinerstein, 1998).
Since the 1940s, Colombia has hosted some level of armed-conflict, led by illegal armed groups
such as guerrilla insurgencies, paramilitary forces and drug traffickers. Over the last few
decades a combination of factors (including unequal land distribution and land grabbing) have
displaced more than 3.5 million people from rural areas, thus perpetuating the state of conflict
and undermining long-term peace consolidation efforts (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012; Ibáñez and
Vélez, 2008; IDMC, 2006; Ross, 2007). Nonetheless, in November 2016, in culmination of over
three years of negotiations, GoC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
signed a peace agreement. This process was facilitated by various countries , including the
governments of Norway, Venezuela and Cuba (Zuleta et al., 2013). In parallel to this process,
the GoC was developing its National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD), which is intended to contribute
to climate change mitigation via forest conservation and development activities.
Yet, the causes of Colombia’s deforestation are not fully understood. The literature indicates
differences between regional and local -level drivers of deforestation (Armenteras et al., 2009,
2013b; Sanchez-Cuervo and Aide, 2013), which in turn reflects the country’s diverse socio-
economic (Armenteras et al., 2011), demographic (Armenteras et al., 2011), political (Sanchez-
Cuervo and Aide, 2013), institutional (e.g. regime categories) (Armenteras et al., 2009) and
biophysical (Sánchez-Cuervo et al., 2012) -contexts. Some studies claim that the overwhelming
driver of land-cover change, across Colombia, is the conversion of forests to livestock pasture
(Davalos et al., 2011; Dávalos et al., 2014; Etter et al., 2006a; Etter et al., 2008; Vina and
Cavelier, 1999); while others identify illegal crop (i.e. coca leaf) -cultivation as the main reason
for deforestation (Álvarez, 2002; Armenteras et al., 2006; Cavelier and Etter, 1995; Dávalos et
al., 2011).
While debates continue as to which constitutes the greater cause of deforestation, other
studies found that both illegal crop-cultivation and cattle pasture constitute serious drivers of
deforestation, in interlinked ways (Chadid et al., 2015; Davalos et al., 2009; Etter et al., 2005;
Etter et al., 2006c; Rincon-Ruiz et al., 2013; Van Ausdal, 2009; Vina et al., 2004). For example, in
many conflict-affected areas, farmers are clearing forests to produce coca and then investing
revenues (from illegal crop sales) in cattle grazing, which is undertaken as a means to
strengthen land-ownership claims (Chadid et al., 2015). Yet, despite the prevalence and
longevity of this observed pattern, its drivers remain little understood. Early studies found
economic returns to be the most significant incentives for cattle-grazing, outweighing other
determining factors, such as cultural preferences or the influences of economic or policy
instruments (Van Ausdal, 2009). However, more recent studies suggest that cattle-grazing is
less influenced by the financial benefits derived from the economic activity, than by other
factors, such as the future value of the land and forthcoming land markets (Castro-Nunez et al.,
2016; Dávalos et al., 2014).
3. METHODS
A hierarchical cluster analysis (Mahalonobis distance and Ward’s method) was computed using
R stats package v 3.2.1 to classify the 1,120 Colombian mainland municipalities based on three
variables: carbon storage; armed actions; and deforestation rates. This classification defines the
possible joint outcomes of the interaction between carbon-storage, armed-conflict and forest-
cover change. The analysis considers ‘carbon storage’ as the 50% above ground forest-biomass
for the year 2010, divided by total municipal area. Meanwhile, ‘armed-actions’ refers to the
average number of attacks, ambushes, harassment and other armed contacts carried out by the
Colombian National Army (FF.AA), the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN).
Meanwhile, ‘deforestation rates’ defines the annual average deforestation rates from 2000 to
2010.
Mainland municipalities’ membership in one of the identified joint outcomes was predicted by
using the following independent variables in a multinomial logistic regression analysis:
population; conflict victims; area under coca leaf production; land concentration (GINI of Land
Index); institutional performance index; distance to (major) markets; unsatisfied basic needs
index (NBI); and forest commons area or area under indigenous communities and afro-
Colombian territories. The model was developed using STATA version 13. Because of data gaps,
the final econometric model considers 1,082 municipalities. Additionally, Kruskal-Wallis post-
hoc tests were conducted using R package agricolae v 1.2-4 to identify median differences
among joint outcomes categories for each of the eight factors.
The selection of independent variables was undertaken based on a literature review and our
understanding of the study site. Economic, social and institutional factors that may influence
the outcomes of the relationship ‘carbon storage- armed conflict-deforestation rate’ were
selected to reflect major arguments on the links between forest-cover and armed-conflicts
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; de Jong et al., 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and
Watts, 2001; Rustad et al., 2008), as well as the drivers of forest-cover changes (Geist and
Lambin, 2002). Each of the selected variables has been linked with land-use change patterns in
Colombia (Armenteras et al., 2013a; Chadid et al., 2015; Davalos et al., 2011; Dávalos et al.,
2014; Etter et al., 2006b; Sanchez-Cuervo and Aide, 2013), as well as with armed-conflict
outcomes (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; IDMC, 2006; Ross, 2007). The
explanation of the selected independent variables, their sources and the period analyzed are
synthesized in Table 1.
Table 1 Description of explanatory variables selected to predict municipalities’ membership in
defined outcomes.
Variable Description and measurement year Source
Population Average total number of  inhabitants 2001-20010 DANE
Coca area Average area cultivated with coca in hectares 2001-2010 SIMCI
Forests commons Hectares under Afro Colombians and Indigenous communitiesownership 2001-2010 IGAC
Unsatisfied Basic Needs
Index
The index (from 0 to 100; No basic need satisfied=0, all basic needs
satisfied=100) is determined through five indicators: adequacy of
housing; degree of household overcrowding; adequacy of basic
household services; degree of economic independence of the
household; household with school-age children who are not attending
school.
2005 DANE
Distance to markets Average linear distance in kilometers to major markets. 2001-2010 IGAC
Land GINI
Average of land Gini index. The index measures land distribution. Values




Average of Fiscal Performance index. The index summarizes in a single
measurement:1) Percentage of revenues for operating; 2) Magnitude of
the debt; 3) Percentage of income due to transfers; 4) Percentage of
revenue accruing from own resources; 5) Percentage of total
investment spending and 6) Capacity savings.
2001-2010 DNP
Victims (Index)
Principal Component Variable of the average total number of forced
displacements by ‘place of displacements’ and average ‘number of
civilians and militaries impacted by landmines, improvised explosives
and unexploded munitions’.
2001-2010 HRO
Forced displacements Average number of forced displacements by ‘place of displacements’. 2001-2010 HRO
Affected by landmines
Number of civilians and militaries impacted by landmines, unexpected
explosives and unexploded munitions 2001-2010 HRO
Variable used to construct the Victims Index
Analyses were based on official data-sets available for public use. Above Ground Biomass (AGB)
maps used were those developed by the Colombian Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and
Environmental Studies (IDEAM) using plot-based forest inventories, Landsat satellite images
and allometric equations (Alvarez et al., 2012; Phillips et al., 2016; Phillips et al., 2011). Forest
cover maps for the year 2000 and 2010 were also developed by IDEAM (Cabrera et al., 2011).
Data on armed-conflicts and conflict victims is compiled by the Observatory for Human Rights
and International Humanitarian Law of the Vice Presidency of Colombia (HRO) and is available
at municipality level for the years 1998 – 2014. Data on illegal crops production was compiled
by SIMCI (the Integrated System for Monitoring Illegal Crops). Meanwhile, the social,
institutional and economic indicators used, were those developed by the Colombian National
Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), the Department of National Planning (DNP)
and the Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi (IGAC).
The study’s data-sets vary in terms of their spatial units of reference. While aggregate data on
armed-conflict, social, institutional and economic factors use municipal boundaries as a
reference, forest-cover data are raster-based; that is, these are estimated with a spatial
resolution equal to that of the source map (i.e. 30 x 30 meters per pixel). Therefore, to obtain
an appropriate spatial unit of analysis, we used standard spatial intersections of the municipal
polygons with the data on forest-cover. For the assignment of attributes based on municipal
geometries, we followed an area-based approach (i.e. the value estimated for each variable
was attributed to municipal geometries, as previously defined). Variables other than carbon
were defined over the ten-year period from 2001 to 2010, due to data availability. An exception
is the variable NBI, which was defined for the year 2005. Meanwhile, the variable victims was
defined by an index extracted through principal component analysis of average number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and average number of civilians and combatants impacted
by landmines, unexpected explosives and unexploded munitions. The two constituent variables
load on a single component with an explained variance over 75% (see Table 2 for more details).
Our victim index is consistent with the oft-cited finding that victims of the Colombian conflict
largely comprise civilians displaced by armed groups, in their efforts to accumulate land
(Cubides, 1999; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008). Nonetheless, it is important to note that this land-
grabbing strategy is predominantly undertaken by armed groups (including paramilitary) that
were not considered in this analysis. The choice of focus on the FARC and ELN was based on the
research coinciding with the GoC-FARC and the GoC-ELN peace processes, and additionally due
to data accessibility constraints. All graphics were prepared using the ggplot2 library in R. stats
package v 3.2.1. In order to visualize and describe non-parametric relationships between
carbon storage and armed conflicts, and between deforestation rates and carbon storage, we
used the spline function in R (Eilers and Marx, 1996).
Table 2 Victims index (Principal component analysis)
Principal component loadings. component
normalization : sum of squares (column)=1
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative Variable Component1
Component1 1.50571 1.01142 0.7529 0.7529 Forced displacements 0.7071
Component2 0.494292 - 0.2471 1 Affected by landmines 0.7071
Method: principal component analysis; number of parameters=2; retained component=1; rotation: oblique
promax (Kaiser off).
4. RESULTS
4.1 Joint outcomes categories
The hierarchical cluster analysis resulted in a four-part classification of Colombian mainland
municipalities (n=1120). The geographic distribution of municipalities according to joint
outcomes categories (Figure 1) is consistent with patterns of spatial distribution of forest-
carbon storage, conflict variables and deforestation rates reported in other studies (Castro-
Nunez et al., 2017). There are 98 municipalities in the sample of 1,120 classified as joint
outcome 1; 80 as joint outcome 2; 681 as joint outcome 3; and 261 as joint outcome 4. Based
on the combination of values that define the joint outcomes categories (Table 3 and Figure
A.1), we refer to these classifications as:
 Stable forested municipalities: municipalities clustered as joint outcome 1 or those that
are little affected by conflicts, very little affected by deforestation and have very high
carbon storage;
 Unstable partially-forested municipalities: municipalities clustered as joint outcome 2 or
those that are highly affected by conflict, affected by deforestation and have high
carbon storage;
 Stable partially-forested municipalities: municipalities clustered as joint outcome 3 or
those that are little affected by conflict, affected by deforestation and have low carbon
storage; and
 Stable non-forested municipalities: municipalities clustered as joint outcome 4 or those
that are little affected by conflict, very highly affected by deforestation and have very
low carbon storage.
Figure 1 Geographic distribution of municipalities according to joint outcomes of the interactions between carbon
storage, armed actions and deforestation rates.
Table 3 Combination of values of carbon storage, armed actions and deforestation rates for the
four joint outcomes.
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max
Joint outcome 1 (98
municipalities)
Carbon Storage (t/ha) 80.58 17.49 75.99 56.74 126.66
Armed actions (actions/yr) 2.17 1.78 1.60 0.10 6.60
Deforestation rate (%/yr) 0.53 0.32 0.44 0.06 1.49
Joint outcome 2 (80 municipalities)
Carbon Storage (t/ha) 48.80 30.58 53.34 2.19 122.80
Armed actions (actions/yr) 17.75 10.64 14.60 6.50 55.50
Deforestation rate (%/yr) 1.55 1.07 1.22 0.23 5.35
Joint outcome 3 (681
municipalities)
Carbon Storage (t/ha) 15.79 14.77 10.87 0.00 59.00
Armed actions (actions/yr) 1.42 1.92 0.60 0.00 9.30
Deforestation rate (%/yr) 1.95 1.08 1.75 0.00 5.26
Joint outcome 4 (261
municipalities)
Carbon Storage (t/ha) 7.89 14.83 1.38 0.00 77.74
Armed actions (events/yr) 0.84 1.80 0.30 0.00 14.70
Deforestation rate (%/yr) 6.49 1.67 6.03 4.20 10.00
Figures 2A and 2C show differences in the distribution of the data among joint outcomes
categories with respect to carbon-storage, armed-conflict and forest-cover change. There is no
linear association between carbon storage and armed actions (Figure 2A). Likewise, there is no
linear association between average deforestation rates and carbon storage (Figure 2C).
However, the fitted trend of the data shows non-parametric relationships between carbon
storage and armed conflicts (Figure 2B), as well as between deforestation rates and carbon
storage (Figure 2D).
Figure 2 Multiple joint outcomes and non-parametric relationships between carbon storage and armed conflicts (A and B) and
between deforestation rates and carbon storage (C and D) in Colombian municipalities.
4.2 Multinomial logistic regression model
The descriptive statics of independent variables selected to predict municipalities’ membership
in defined joint outcomes are presented in Table A.1. Results of the multinomial logistic
regression model are presented in Table 4. The final model proved resilient to a series of post-
estimation tests. Likelihood ratio tests for independent variables (Ho: B = 0) and Wald tests for
simple and composite linear hypotheses about individual parameters were not significant for
any variable. The Small-Hsiao test for violation of the IIA assumption was not significant.
Standard errors calculated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator did not produce
significantly different results. Regression diagnostics do not indicate that any observations
unduly influenced the results.




std. error z-value Prob >z
Stable forested (n = 68)
Population (#) -1.25E-06 0.00E+00 -4.440 0.000***
Victims (index) 2.88E-03 6.45E-03 0.450 0.655
Coca (has) 9.13E-05 4.00E-05 2.450 0.014**
Land concentration index (GINI) -7.31E-02 3.76E-02 -1.950 0.052*
Fiscal performance index -3.14E-03 1.14E-03 -2.750 0.006***
Distance to markets (Km) 7.05E-05 5.00E-05 1.400 0.161
Unsatisfied basic needs index 7.08E-04 2.70E-04 2.650 0.008***
Forests commons (has) 2.96E-07 0.00E+00 2.870 0.004***
Unstable partially-forested (n = 77)
Population  (#) 1.10E-07 0.00E+00 1.470 0.140
Victims (index) 4.63E-02 8.77E-03 5.280 0.000***
Coca (has) 1.34E-04 4.00E-05 3.170 0.002***
Land concentration index (GINI) 8.97E-02 6.13E-02 1.460 0.143
Fiscal performance index -8.97E-04 1.29E-03 -0.690 0.488
Distance to markets (Km) 1.89E-05 9.00E-05 0.210 0.836
Unsatisfied basic needs index -2.21E-04 3.60E-04 -0.620 0.536
Forests commons (has) 3.29E-07 0.00E+00 2.750 0.006**
Stable partially-forested (n = 677)
Population  (#) 6.70E-07 0.00E+00 1.990 0.046**
Victims (index) 1.63E-03 2.59E-02 0.060 0.950
Coca (has) 3.58E-05 1.70E-04 0.220 0.830
Land concentration index (GINI) 2.23E-01 1.22E-01 1.820 0.069*
Fiscal performance index 7.28E-03 2.36E-03 3.080 0.002***
Distance to markets (Km) 3.13E-04 1.90E-04 1.620 0.105
Unsatisfied basic needs index -2.95E-03 9.50E-04 -3.110 0.002***
Forests commons (has) 3.26E-06 0.00E+00 5.550 0.000***
Stable non-forested (n = 260)
Population  (#) 4.71E-07 0.00E+00 2.550 0.011**
Victims (index) -5.09E-02 2.33E-02 -2.180 0.029**
Coca (has) -2.61E-04 1.60E-04 -1.680 0.092*
Land concentration index (GINI) -2.39E-01 9.79E-02 -2.450 0.014**
Fiscal performance index -3.24E-03 1.76E-03 -1.840 0.066*
Distance to markets (Km) -4.03E-04 1.70E-04 -2.410 0.016**
Unsatisfied basic needs index 2.46E-03 8.80E-04 2.810 0.005***
Forests commons (has) -3.88E-06 0.00E+00 -6.440 0.000***
Number of observations = 1082
Likelihood ratio _ 2(24) = 556.02
pseudo R2 =  0.257
Prob. __ 2 = 0.0000
* p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01
‘Dependent Variable’ = joint outcomes of the interaction between carbon storage, armed conflict and deforestation rate;
‘Population’= total number of inhabitant in municipalities’ urban and rural areas; ‘Victims’= principal component analysis of:
average number of internally displaced persons and average number of civilians and militaries impacted by landmines,
improvised explosives and unexploded munitions; ‘Coca’=average area in hectares under production of coca leave; ‘Land
concentration index’ =average Gini of land Index; ‘Fiscal performance index’= average fiscal performance Index; ‘Distance to
markets’ = distance to major markets (Kilometres); ‘Unsatisfied basic need index = index of unsatisfied basic need for the year
2005; ‘Forest commons’ = area under control of indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians (hectares). Explanatory variables
were defined over the ten year period from 2001 to 2010, with the exception of ‘unsatisfied basic needs’, which was defined for
the year 2005.
We find that stable forested municipalities are positively associated with the production of coca
and land area under forests commons and poverty, and that these are negatively associated
with land concentration, municipal fiscal performance and population. Municipalities
categorized as unstable partially-forested are positively associated with coca production,
conflict victims and forest commons. Stable partially-forested municipalities are positively
associated with land concentration, fiscal performance, forest commons and population; while
these are negatively associated with poverty. We found an unexpected positive association of
poverty with municipalities categorized as stable non-forested. These municipalities are also
positively associated with population, whereas they are negatively associated with distance to
major markets, fiscal performance, coca production, victims, land concentration and area under
forest commons.
Non-linear responses to socio-economic indicators were evident in our analysis. Larger
populations are associated with a lower probability that municipalities will be classified as
stable forested (Figure 3A). Municipalities with larger coca areas are more likely to be classified
as unstable partially-forested and less likely to be classified as stable non-forested (Figure 3B).
Municipalities with a higher number of victims are more likely to be classified as unstable
partially-forested and less likely to be classified as stable non-forested (Figure 3C). Additionally,
municipalities with larger concentrations of land are more likely to be classified as stable
partially-forested municipalities and less likely to be classified as stable non-forested (Figure
3D). Higher fiscal performances are associated with a higher probability that these
municipalities will be classified as stable partially-forested and lower probabilities that these
municipalities will be stable non-forested and stable forested.
Meanwhile, greater distance to markets has a negative effect on the predicted probability of
being classified as stable non-forested municipality, and no effect on the probability of being
classified in the other three categories. Municipalities with larger areas under forest commons
are more likely to be classified as stable partially-forested and less likely to be classified as
stable non-forested (Figure 3E). The unsatisfied basic needs index (NBI) has a positive effect on
the predicted probability of being classified in both the stable forested and the stable non-
forested categories, as well as a negative effect on the predicted probability of being classified
as stable partially-forested. However, municipalities with higher populations with NBI are more
likely to be classified as stable non-forested municipalities and less likely to be classified as
stable partially-forested (Figure 3F).
Figure 3 The effect of social, institutional and economic factors on the probability of being classified in defined municipality
categories. (A) The effect of population on the predicted probability of being classified in: stable forested; stable partially-
forested; or stable non-forested municipalities. (B) The effect of area under coca production on the predicted probability of
being classified in: stable forested; or unstable partially-forested municipalities. (C) The effect of victims on the predicted
probability of being classified in: unstable partially-forested; or stable non-forested municipalities. (D) The effect of land
concentration on the predicted probability of being classified in: stable forested; stable partially-forested; or stable non-
forested municipalities. (E) The effect of forest commons (area under indigenous communities and Afro-Colombian collective
lands) on the predicted probability of being classified in: stable forested; unstable partially-forested; stable partially-forested; or
stable non-forested municipalities. (F) The effect of unsatisfied basic needs on the predicted probability of being classified in:
stable forested; unstable partially-forested; stable partially-forested; or stable non-forested municipalities.
Results also indicate that the variability of factors for specific joint outcomes categories with a
small number of municipalities (Table A1) jeopardizes non-linear relationships (particularly with
respect to population and coca) in the sense that, despite the prediction line being non-linear,
the point-wise confidence interval shows that there is no statistical non-linearity. Specifically,
the high variability of population for stable non-forested and for stable partially forested
municipalities is reflected in the point-wise confidence intervals, indicating no statistical non-
linear relationships (Figure 3A). Similarly, the high variability of coca area within municipalities
classified as stable forested is reflected in the point-wise confident interval, indicating that the
probabilities of stable forested are non-linear with respect to hectares of coca (Figure 3B).
Although this constitutes a caveat of our approach, it does not have implications for the forest-
conflict transition models proposed below.
4.3 Median differences in selected explanatory variables among defined joint outcomes
The Kruskal-Wallis Test statistics are highly significant for: Population (χ 2 (3) = 98.82), Coca
area (χ 2 (3) = 101.196), Forest commons (χ 2 (3) = 234.14), NBI (χ 2 (3) = 121.65), Distance to
markets (χ 2 (3) = 101.196), GINI Index (χ 2 (3) = 34.20), Fiscal performance (χ 2 (3) = 61.81), and
Victims (χ 2 (3) = 216.52). Therefore, it was meaningful to apply post-hoc tests to identify
median differences in the eight factors among the defined joint outcomes categories. Tests
confirm differences (p<0.1) in the distribution of values of explanatory variables among the
joint outcomes categories. More specifically, stable forested municipalities are distinct from
unstable partially-forested municipalities due to differences in: population (p<0.01); victims
(P<0.01); land concentration (p<0.1); unsatisfied basic need (p<0.01); distance to markets
(p<0.01); and fiscal performance (p<0.01). Among factors differentiating unstable partially-
forested municipalities from stable partially-forested are: increased population and forest
commons (p<0.01); and reduced population (p<0.01); and poverty (p<0.01). Whereas, factors
differentiating stable partially-forested from stable non-forested municipalities are: increased
poverty (p<0.01); and reduced land concentration (p<0.01); and forest commons (p<0.1).
Identified differences are consistent with the multinomial regression model’s findings.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Interactions between forest-cover and armed conflicts generate multiple outcomes (Baumann
and Kuemmerle, 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Butsic et al., 2015; Ordway, 2015; Sanchez-Cuervo
and Aide, 2013). A deeper understanding of this relationship, therefore, requires simultaneous
consideration of these outcomes and the social, economic and institutional factors that drive
them (Baumann and Kuemmerle, 2016). Our analysis has operationalized these insights with a
statistical approach that incorporates the complexity of multiple outcomes, as well as of the
factors that may be at play in their occurrence. This led to identification of four different types
of associations between forest-cover and armed-conflicts that are differentiated by social,
institutional and economic factors.
Associations indicated by the multinomial logistic regression model, in
combination with variations among the joint outcomes categories confirmed by post-hoc tests,
suggest that: armed-conflicts and forest-cover change patterns in conflicted-affected areas of
Colombia are connected to specific socio-economic factors present during the agricultural
colonization processes. Such factors include illicit crop production, unequal land distribution,
low institutional capacities and forced displacements. These findings address a research gap by
providing statistically sound evidence for associations between armed-conflict and land-related
issues (including unequal land distribution and land-grabbing) in a tropical forested country,
which has often been assumed (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Ross, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Van Der
Haar, 2016), but rarely demonstrated empirically.
While remaining cautionary about the causality of the associations we report, findings allow us
to propose forest-conflict transition models for Colombia (Figure 4). The models were inspired
by non-parametric relationships between: carbon-storage and armed-conflicts (Figure 1B); and
deforestation-rates and carbon-storage (Figure 1D). Using these models we depict the dynamic
links between forest-cover and armed-conflict and additionally propose a theoretical
framework for examining how Colombia’s land-cover changes are associated with colonist
farmers, illegal actors (e.g. traffickers and armed groups), unequal land distribution and land-
grabbing. Models suggest that, during agricultural colonization processes, conflicts increase in
line with forest carbon losses, but that (at a certain stage of carbon-loss) conflict then
decreases. This tendency is described by an inverted U-shape relationship between conflict and
forest carbon-storage. Meanwhile, carbon contents decrease and deforestation rates increase
steadily over time; apparently this is particularly relevant in municipalities with few areas
assigned to forest commons. Whereas, deforestation rates increase until forest and poverty
indicators reach their lowest levels.
Figure 4 Forest-conflict transition models for Colombia
The models hypothesized that unpopulated forests in Colombia (refer to points marked as ‘1’ in
Figure 4) provide opportunities for operating guerrilla groups, by providing hideouts and
resources to finance war (i.e. outputs of coca plantations). They also hypothesize that increases
in levels of conflict and rates of deforestation (probably in tandem with forced displacements
and land grabbing) coincide with the expansion of agricultural frontiers (see points marked as
‘2’ in Figure 4). The models also illustrate that, at a certain point when colonization and land
grabbing are completed, levels of conflict decrease and institutional indicators improve (see
points marked as ‘3’ in Figure 4). Moreover, they show that the redistribution of access to land
begins as wealth indicators decline (see points marked as ‘4’ in Figure 4).
The hypotheses in the models are consistent with arguments that agricultural colonization
fronts in conflict-affected areas of Colombia are usually related to cattle pasture and the illicit
crop economy (Chadid et al., 2015; Etter et al., 2006c), as well as to arguments that cattle
pasture production and illicit crops are tools to access and enhance the value of previously
marginal and conflict-affected land (Castro-Nunez et al., 2016; Dávalos et al., 2014). They are
also consistent with arguments that the conflict in Colombia is related to land-use competition
and land-access inequalities (Albertus and Kaplan, 2013; Ross, 2007), even though forested
areas are linked with the historical causes of conflict and play an important role in the
strategies of armed groups (Castro-Nunez et al., 2017; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; de Jong et al.,
2007; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Rustad et al., 2008).
The hypotheses are supported by combined results from the multinomial logistic regression
model and Kruskal Wallis tests. Although the models require further testing, they nonetheless
already provide useful visual depictions of the environmental security field’s major arguments
(i.e. opportunities, scarcity, and accessibility) on the relationship between forest-cover and
armed-conflicts. Visual models also provide useful means to capture- and relay to policymakers-
the causes of forest cover-changes in a conflict-affected country. Specifically, models suggest
that, for Colombia, the following concurrent conditions are conducive to both continued
armed-conflict and large-scale forest-cover changes: (1) proximity to forested areas that might
serve as cover for armed groups and illegal activities; (2) availability of high-value natural
resources (such as outputs of illegal crop production to finance guerrilla movements and
agricultural colonization); (3) sites of grievances (such as agricultural colonization frontiers with
people displaced by land-access inequalities and violence); and (4) competition for the power
derived from the control (and grabbing) of scarce resources, such as land.
Based on our findings we argue that: (1) the impact of armed conflicts on forest biomass
depends on how specific socio-economic processes (e.g. colonization processes) intersect with
armed groups’ uses of forested areas (e.g. sources of valuable resources and sources of land
assets); (2) reducing tropical deforestation is not only a function of land management (Putz and
Romero, 2012), economic incentives (Tacconi, 2012) and forest governance (Phelps et al., 2010)
- it is also about illegal activities and, importantly, about addressing the historical reasons for
violence, which in Colombia are related to inequality and grievances relating to land-ownership
and forced displacements; and (3) if governments wish to retain their natural forests for various
conservation purposes (such as avoiding forest-carbon stock losses, while reducing
opportunities for guerrilla groups to operate), they ought to target development activities for
farmers living at agricultural frontiers and forest dependent people, rather than leaving these
groups to suffer the negative impacts of conflicts, thus fueling the cycle of grievances and
disputes over land rights. In that respect, our results indicate that the presence of forest
commons (or collective lands) apparently reverses and reduces the causes of conflicts, while
simultaneously providing contributions to carbon storage and to meeting basic needs, as is
argued by many others (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2008; Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009).
Finally, the findings have important practical implications for conflict-affected tropical countries
that are pursuing REDD+ (Bates, 2016; Castro-Nunez et al., 2016; Castro-Nunez et al., 2017). In
the Colombian context, the GoC has declared its commitment to meeting forest-based
emissions reductions (the Paris Agreement) and biodiversity conservation (the Aichi) targets. It
is anticipated that strategies leading to the achievement of forest conservation goals (whether
for climate change mitigation or for biodiversity) will be implemented along with the GoC-FARC
peace agreement commitments (Republica-de-Colombia and Fuerzas-Armadas-Revolucionarias-
de-Colombia, 2014). This implies facilitating forest conservation in a post-conflict scenario,
while simultaneously addressing the historical reasons for violence, as  well as the emerging
challenges related to the accomplishment of the peace agreements (Baptiste et al., 2017;
Negret et al., 2017). To do so will require innovative approaches, underpinned by robust
analyses of the contexts. The analytical framework applied in this research could assist in better
understanding the complex dynamics at play and thus inform decisions about how to
appropriately target the multiple aims of securing peacebuilding, biodiversity conservation and
forest carbon-storage. This stands in contrast to overly simplistic explanatory models of the
relationships between conflict and forest-cover, based on unsubstantiated assumptions.
However, challenges to doing so include that armed-conflicts in many countries have impeded
the collection of reliable and recent socio-economic data. Nonetheless, even with limited
variables, the proposed methodology would provide better insights than those generated by
current approaches. Moreover, when historical data is available, the proposed methodology
could be enhanced and conflict transition models for tropical forested countries better
estimated.
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Appendices
Fig A1Municipalities’ descriptive statistics according to their membership in combined outcomes of the interactions between
carbon storage (t/ha), armed actions (number of actions) and deforestation rate (hectares/year)
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of variables selected to predict municipalities’ membership in
defined joint outcomes
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max
Full set of Colombian mainland
municipalities (1120)
Population 38507.31 234738 12590.9 236.4 6890847.5
Coca area 79.18 391.44 0 0 5136.5
Forests commons 23399.21 264355.7 0 0 6909088
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (Index) 44.97 20.9504 42.57 5.36 100
Distance to markets 128.57 108.47 102.01 0 926.47
Land GINI 0.69 0.11 0.70 0 0.98
Fiscal Performance 59.19 5.84 58.38 39.91 83.35
Victims (index) 2.83E-10 1.23 -0.44 -0.55 12.78
Forced displacements 317.77 664.42 74.7 0 8390.2
Affected by landmines 0.71 2.379 0 0 34
Stable forested  municipalities (98)
Population 11494.96 10595.95 8827.95 236.4 68452.5
Coca area 254.67 648.11 14.2 0 3238.8
Forests commons 219462.57 903800.5 8675.27 0 6909088
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index 68.92 24.46 69.7 13.01 100
Distance to markets 280.37 218.83 184.20 14.50 926.47
Land GINI 0.60 0.20 0.62 0 0.98
Fiscal Performance 55.47 4.96 55.71 40.41 67.75
Victims (index) -0.060 0.60 -0.27 -0.55 2.86
Forced displacements 337.69 483.72 188.05 4 3124.2
Affected by landmines 0.44 0.82 0 0 4
Unstable partially-forested
municipalities (80)
Population 194126.09 832321.8 30773 6340.5 6890847.5
Coca area 47.92 29.04 52.98 2.19 122.80
Forests commons 54784.07 176801.3 4965.32 0 1092513
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index 51.54 24.12 48.21 9.16 100
Distance to markets 153.56 96.29 136.02 0 519.15
Land GINI 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.30 0.9
Fiscal Performance 59.59 5.24 58.91 43.64 75.996
Victims (index) 2.99 2.59 2.63 -0.15 12.78
Forced displacements 1690.29 1384.22 1374.25 154.3 8390.2
Affected by landmines 5.88 6.19 3.35 0.1 34
Stable partially-forested municipalities
(681)
Population 26725.72 63342.86 11499.9 896.5 899489.4
Coca area 14.95 70.311 0 0 953.5
Forests commons 4020.38 37148.85 0 0 814620.1
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index 40.17 18.07 38.08 5.36 100
Distance to markets 112.12 73.27 95.53 0 545.20
Land GINI 0.70 0.09 0.71 0.26 0.98
Fiscal Performance 60.08 5.94 59.25 39.91 83.35
Victims (index) -0.23 0.68 -0.46 -0.55 7.06
Forced displacements 214.68 443.17 60.35 0 7145.8
Affected by landmines 0.32 0.90 0 0 15.1
Stable non-forested municipalities
(261)
Population 31691.12 89361.59 13225.3 1162.5 1151094
Coca area 7.11 45.56 0 0 443.6
Forests commons 590.52 4606.98 0 0 54479.12
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index 46.67 18.68 45.47 9.24 91.68
Distance to markets 106.57 75.82 82.042 0 308.75
Land GINI 0.68 0.09 0.68 0.38 0.91
Fiscal Performance 57.85 5.298 57.35 45.41 81.26
Victims (index) -0.30 0.57 -0.49 -0.55 4.18
Forced displacements 158.21 287.64 49.3 1.5 1818
Affected by landmines 0.26 1.22 0 0 12.4
Variable used to construct the Victims index
